This paper reviews the progress of banking reforms in China over the last five years. The stated goal of reform is to "transform major banks into internationally competitive joint-stock commercial banks with appropriate corporate governance structures, adequate capital, stringent internal controls, safe and sound business operations, quality services as well as desirable profitability." The reform strategy relies on three pillars -extensive publicly-financed bailouts, implementation of the international best practices in bank governance and regulation and listing of major banks at the Hong Kong stock exchange. This strategy has been successful in stabilizing the three major banks. However, our review of academic and commercial research indicates that there is no evidence that the stabilization is sustainable. Prudential indicators of the largest banks are comparable to international averages, but this is an outcome of large bail outs and ongoing credit boom rather than fundamental change in banker's incentives. Reforms of bank governance and regulatory framework need more time to proliferate throughout the banking and regulatory hierarchies. However, time alone would not solve the problem as the reform design retains important departures from international standards. These standards are implemented in a selective manner; those aspects that help to concentrate key powers in the center are implemented rather vigorously, whereas principles that require independence of banks' boards and regulators are ignored. Thus the largest Chinese banks remain under the firm state control and can be used as development policy tools for the better or the worse.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to address the question whether reforms of the largest Chinese banks implemented since 2002 turned them into independent commercial entities that operate in line with the best international practices of modern banking. The proposed answer is no. The largest Chinese banks remain under the firm state control, thus state policy objectives dominate over the long term stability of banks. The substantial progress in formal implementation of "the best international regulatory and governance practices", the listing in Hong Kong and presence of minority foreign investors notwithstanding, there is no doubt that should the future course of events threaten economic growth and/or political stability in China, major banks would be among the policy tools used to address the problem regardless of the impact on banks' own financial stability 2 .
The regulatory and governance reforms of major banks closely follow international best
practices, yet they also retain some important "Chinese characteristics". The policy-makers on the central level use international standards instrumentally to push through reforms on the subcentral levels. However, when these standards require independence of the regulator or bank board, they are tweaked so that the State Council and the Chinese Communist Party remain at the helm of power. Reforms on the sub-central level follow the prescriptions of international standards more closely, but even there it will take more time before they trickle down to every bank branch.
There was major improvement in financial stability indicators of major banks over the last few years 3 . However, there is no conclusive evidence that low ratios of non-performing assets 4 , are results of improved credit culture. They may well be explained by the on-going credit boom that increases the size of credit portfolio (thus reducing the relative proportion of outstanding loans to non-performing assets). As new loans mature, they may turn non-performing as was the case several years after the previous credit boom in early 1990s. On the other hand, reforms to date prevent some of the early 1990s excesses 5 and thus should reduce potential losses to more manageable volumes. Whether future losses could be resolved by banks alone or whether they
would require yet another state financed bailout remains to be seen. In short, banking reform in China depicts some progress towards the proclaimed end goal -"to transform major banks into internationally competitive joint-stock commercial banks with appropriate corporate governance structures, adequate capital, stringent internal controls, safe and sound business operations, quality services as well as desirable profitability", but this has not been reached to date.
To support our claim that partial governance reforms are unlikely to prevent accumulation of financial strains in major banks, we first review the reform achievements of the last few years, focusing particularly on the regulatory reform implemented by China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) since 2003. In the subsequent section, we review financial restructuring and governance reforms of three major Chinese banks now listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE). The third section discusses the "market test" of reformed banks by reviewing their stock performance, ratings and views of financial analysts. We address the apparent paradox that investors are keen to buy banks stocks despite being aware of prevailing weaknesses and long term uncertainties. We find an explanation in the credibility of the state guarantee behind the three major banks that are too-big-to-fail. In the concluding section we review the departures of the current reform strategy from recommendations based on international standards. We propose possible interpretation of these departures that could serve as basis for further research.
Regulatory reforms in banking sector
Prior to reform period there was the soviet-style monobank system in China. The first major banking reform was implemented in 1984, when the bulk of the real sector financing was shifted from the state budget to the banking sector. At the same time, state enterprises were allowed to retain after tax profits, which triggered rapid growth of savings channeled to the banking system. This phenomenon continues to date as the savings rate exceeds 50 percent. Still in 1984, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) -the central bank -and the four largest state-owned commercial banks (SOBs) were formally separated 6 .
It took another decade before the two-tier banking system was given the legal underpinning 7 . In 1995 the Commercial Bank Law was promulgated to provide formal legal basis for transforming specialized state banks into state-owned commercial banks. In an effort to shift the statedirected lending out of the commercial banks, three policy banks were created 8 . New laws aspired to improve lending standards and making bank management accountable for bank performance. New loan classification standards -more in line with international rules -were gradually introduced, loan officers were made individually responsible for new NPLs, and SOB's Chairmen became accountable for achieving targets set up by the government. The new banking rules also facilitated a gradual shift from credit plans to credit allocation based on asset and liabilities management. To support the restructuring effort the PBOC has strengthened balance sheets of the largest banks by capital injection of RMB 270 billion (USD 33 bn) and by removal of RMB 1.4 trillion (USD 170 bn) worth of pre-1996 non-performing loans. The SOBs were supposed to be responsible for dealing with NPL incurred after 1996 from their own resources. 6 The Big Four are Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Bank of China (BOC) and China Construction Bank (CCB). The term Big Three used in this paper refers to ICBC, CCB and BOC that have already been listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
7 Until then the banking sector was operating on the basis of the Interim Banking Control Regulations of the People's Republic of China promulgated by the State Council in 1986.
Lessons form the East Asian financial crisis gave new impetus to banking reforms 9 . Although China was protected from the worst impact of the crisis by functioning system of capital controls, policy-makers in Beijing understood that poorly governed financial sector is a major threat to economic development. Reforms between 1998 and 2002 were characterized by "throwing money at the problem", but had little effect on the bank governance and risk management. The OECD analysis at the time concluded that the "financial quality of SOBs, is rather poor, with low earnings, inadequate capital, and high levels of non-performing assets.
[They] would probably be insolvent if their balance sheets were subjected to careful scrutiny using strict loan classification standards… [Their] governance system … is not well suited to operating as profit-seeking institutions ... The management of the banks is not conducted by professional managers with a clear mandate to return value to shareholders, but by government officials whose goal is to achieve a balance of economic and non-economic objectives." (OECD 2005: 382) .
In 2002 the 'National Financial Work Conference' of the State Council devised new blueprint for deeper reforms and created the CBRC to implement them. The CBRC has adopted banking reform based on the concept of "grasping both ends and facilitating development of the majority." The "first end" refers to reforms of the largest state owned banks that control over 50 percent of banking assets. The "second end" is about reforms of over 50 thousand rural credit cooperatives that account for some 10 percent of banking assets. The remaining "majority" consists of 120 joint-stock and city commercial banks. The majority group is expected to increase as foreign banks move into Chinese market following the 2006 phase out of all entry restrictions in accordance with the WTO agreement. Henceforth, we will focus on the reform achievements of the largest banks.
The CBRC is headed by Liu Mingkang, former deputy governor of the PBOC and president of the Bank of China, who has earned reformist credentials with the foreign observers (EIU 2006: 8) .
His principal challenge is to develop enforceable regulatory and supervisory framework that would change incentives of bankers towards prudent banking. This is no easy task in China, 9 The key lesson from East Asian crisis is that without adequate governance and regulatory structure banking sectors remain prone to collapse, if exposed to macroeconomic shocks (such abrupt change in capital flows).
where the four largest banks employ 1.4 million people who work in nearly 70,000 branches.
The CBRC itself has 333 offices, 1,753 local supervisory agencies and employs staff of over 23,000, which turns internal capacity building into a major challenge in itself.
In practical terms, the CBRC has focused on establishing itself as an organization, training its staff, creating new regulatory framework compliant with WTO, forcing more timely and reliable disclosure of information and, most importantly, pushing ahead pilot reforms of the four largest banks. It has also participated in the government attempt to cool off overheated sectors of Chinese economy and tried to reduce extend of fraud and illegal use of banking funds (CBRC 2007 ). CBRC's reform blueprint is build around international standards and best practices.
Namely regulatory reform is guided by (i) the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision,
(ii) a combination of Basel I and Basel II capital accords and (iii) international practices in loan loss classification rules. In the rest of this section, we will review the current status of implementation of these three sets of rules. Source : Brehm, Macht (2005: 175 -177 and Appendix 1) Relatively high degree of compliance with the Core Principles does not necessarily mean that they are enforced. As is demonstrated by the experience of many transitions and developing countries for the regulatory reform to succeed the new structure of incentives must be enforceable and enforced (Pistor et al. 2003 , World Bank 2003 . The CBRC is making progress in enforcement of new regulations (see Exhibit 2), although given this size, scope and complexity of the sector, cases and corrective actions affect only the tip of an iceberg (Chow 2006 Numerous reports point out two key challenges to better enforcement of the new rules. The first is the sheer size of the country. Whereas, branches of major banks and of CBRC in the key economic centers are reasonably well suited to enforce new rules and struggle against the powerful political interests, on the provincial level there is much less progress (Chu et al. 2006 , Davies 2006 , Tang 2007 . It proves very difficult to overcome the long term legacies of decentralization. The second challenge is that of human capital. There are very few experienced bankers and regulators alike thus they need to be trained in large number which will take some time (Chu et al. 2006a , Hope and Hu 2006 , Brean 2007 (Chu et al. 2006b: 3) . The zero percent risk weight would be reasonable if these AMCs were backed by explicit state guarantee, which they are not.
The risk weighting system is also biased in favor of lending to the central government. It assigns zero risk weight to claim on Chinese government and 50 percent weight to claims on public sector entities invested by the central government 13 . Foreign denominated claims on central government also got zero risk weight, which is contrary to the Basel rules (Brehm, Macht 2005: 178) . These departures from the Basel Accord make the Chinese Capital Asset Ratios (CAR) less internationally comparable. Moreover, they make it somewhat easier to achieve the required 8 percent benchmark.
The third important aspect of the regulatory framework is the loan classification system. This refers to the process that banks use to review quality of their loan portfolios and assign loans to might not be aware that there is a problems threatening the bank stability until they cumulate 13 This contrasts with the 100% risk weight assigned to claims on the public sector entities invested by the local government. The high risk weight makes this lending more expensive as it must be fully backed by bank capital. The rule shifts resources to central level and makes local bank branches less able to bend into local pressure for loans. China has recently aligned the tax treatment of provisions more with the Hong Kong practice.
The ceilings on maximum amount of provisions that is tax deductible were abolished thus removing one major disincentive to prudent provisioning. However, When rules stipulated by CBRC are combined with those developed by each of the Big Three, the difference in the formal loan classification framework in China and Hong Kong is relatively small. Indeed, Lai (2007:29) concludes that they are comparable despite their lack of uniformity across major banks 18 . Nevertheless, if the logic that more risky economies ought to have more stringent standards holds, then the Chinese rules fail to compensate for the extra risks of borrowers from the mainland.
The potentially more important problem is the lack of uniformity of classification rules. Different approaches of banks add to the complexity of the system and make rules more difficult to enforce. Although it can be argued that such system is close to the "internal rating" approach of Basel II, it runs contrary to the well established insight form transition and developing economies that simple rules are more credible, because they are enforceable (Barth, Caprio, Levine 2006) . The higher complexity of rules only increases the demands on the regulatory capacity of CBRC, which is in short supply even by its own assessment (Tang 2007) .
Although regulatory reforms of major banks closely followed recommendations of international best practice their implementation retains numerous "Chinese characteristics" that depart form the intention of the international rules. Some of these characteristics can be explained by relatively short period of reform implementation. These may disappear as the reform effort continues. However, there are other departures from international standards that reflect conscious policy choice. These include lack of regulatory independence, rules that encourage lending to project backed by the central government and lack of uniformity in classification and 17 The BoC and CCB report in compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS39).
18 Fitch, the rating agency, points out that" many of the banks … are in the process of introducing more refined internal systems for classifying both customers and loans. … Nevertheless, while current initiatives are certainly positive, [Fitch] would highlight that numerous external factors continue to complicate the transition toward improved management of credit risk, including poor borrower disclosure and accounting, the lack of a deep and experienced pool of credit officers, and nascent credit bureaus. As a result, actual progress will likely be protracted and slower than expected or advertised" (2006:6). The lack of alternatives to SOB's credits, such as FDI, in backward provinces further complicates diffusion of modern banking practices. Local government officials are reluctant to cede the control over bank branches as it allows them to keep benefits of reckless lending locally and shift losses to the central government. Shih (2004b) and Heilman (2005a Heilman ( , 2005b analyze the complex political coalitions that protect these locally beneficial arrangements. They point out that the selective implementation of international standards strengthened the central control, but many non standard practices prevail. One of them is the issuance of local government "guarantees" for certain projects, which are illegal, but local bank branches often accept them (Marshall et al. 2005: 5) .
The general problem of absence of rule of law in China has repercussions for the banking reform too. The legal system remains fuzzy, slow, ineffective and uncertain. It lacks of elementary transparency and corruption is pervasive. This undermines contractual relationships of banks and firms and hurts especially private enterprises that are the most dynamic source of economic growth . Poor legal system also explains why investments and loans are often channeled to the real sector via Hong Kong dressed up as FDI that enjoy better protection (Huang 2003) . This increases risks that credits will be "lost" in a web of complex arrangements, adds to transaction costs and increases demands on bank's monitoring capacity.
Corruption still plays a significant role in bank lending in China (Marshall et al. 2005: 6 Initially, it was tested on BOC and CCB; the ICBC has followed the same path once it has proven feasible. The ABC is striving to follow, but associated difficulties have proved insurmountable to date.
Pilot Guidelines have defined the reform goal as: "to build within three years … modern and internationally competitive joint-stock commercial banks with adequate capital, strict internal controls, safe and sound business operations, quality services and desirable profitability". To this end, the CBRC defined seven quantitative performance criteria based on the averages of the world's top 100 banks 22 . Again, international standards and benchmarks provided as much inspiration for the governance reform as they did for regulatory reforms.
Banks were also given several governance targets. They were to build governance structure of a joint-stock company, comprising of shareholders meeting, board of directors, supervisory board 21 Moreover, these sectors are responsible for lion's share of environmental damage that is recognized as increasingly important problem requiring policy action. This may include shut offs of industrial facilities in highly polluted locations with consequent inability of affected enterprises to repay their loans. 22 The seven performance criteria published in March 2004 are as follows (i) net return on total assets shall be 0.6 percent in the second year after the completion of financial restructuring and up to good international standard within three years, (ii) net return on equity shall achieve 11 percent in the second year after the completion of financial restructuring and increase to over 13 percent gradually in the subsequent years, (iii) cost to revenue ratio shall be controlled within 35 to 45 percent starting from the second year of financial restructuring, (iv) non-performing loan ratio shall be under 5 percent, (v) capital adequacy ratio shall be over 8 percent, (vi) concentration risk of facilities shall be 10 or lower, and (vii) coverage of NPL provisions shall be 60 or higher and increase to 100 percent within five years.
and senior management and clarify decision-making powers of all these bodies. These bodies were to design a development strategy the sole goal of which was to be maximization of profitability. The organizational restructuring also required banks to create necessary systems of internal control and risk management that would cover all "Basel 1.5" components.
The single most important obstacle on the banking reform path was a gargantuan proportion of non-performing assets. After several rounds of pre-2002 bail outs NPL ratios were reduced, but still between 15 and 25 percent of loans in major banks' portfolio was not to be repaid (see Exhibit 3) 23 . There was no plausible scenario that Chinese banks could "grow out" of these losses without external financial assistance. Further state-orchestrated bailouts were necessary.
This time, however, the formal conditions attached to bail out were well defined in the Pilot
Guidelines and CBRC was is position to enforce them much more than similar, but vague conditions attached to pre-2002 bailout packages. The available estimates put the total expected costs of Big Four bailouts at about 30 percent of GDP (Ma 2007) 25 . This estimate is somewhat higher than fiscal costs of bank restructuring in small European economies in transition. In these cases, the costs ranged from 1 percent in Estonia to 27 percent of GDP in Bulgaria, with average around 12 percent (Tang et al. 2000) .
Indeed, if the bill for bank restructuring stays at 30 percent, the Chinese case would be one of the ten most expensive cases of bank insolvency worldwide since 1975 (Caprio and Klingebiel 1996) .
Exhibit 4: Estimates of capital injections into Big Three since 1998
Government borrowing (Ernst & Young 2006: 14) . This contrasted with the official figure of USD 133 bn (CBRC 2006) . After the protests of Chinese officials, the Ernst & Young has withdrawn the report explaining that it did not undergo "normal internal review and approval process before it was released … [and] it contains errors" 28 . Fitch, the rating agency also stated in its annual report on Chinese banks that it is "cautious with regard to the asset quality of Chinese banks, 26 The ICBC, BOC and CCB are audited by Ernst&Young, PriceWaterhouseCoopers and KPMG respectively. 27 The experience with initial bank restructuring in other transition countries is such that low NPL ratio after bail outs did not last long unless banks were privatized to foreign strategic owners (Berglof and Bolton 2002 , Bokros 2000 , Kudrna et al. 2002 , Keren, Ofer 2003 . given ongoing issues with accounting and disclosure (for both banks and borrowers)" (Chu et al. 2006: 4) .
Sustainability of the low NPL ratio is the more important issue. Continued economic growth, improvement in profitability of the largest state-owned enterprises, and the diversification into fee-based banking services currently reduce the pressure on prudential indicators (Lai 2007 , Chan et al. 2007 ). 29 However, there are identifiable threats that may gradually undermine banks' financial stability despite the supportive economic environment. There is a consensus that the two most immediate threats are: (i) the speed in which high level of "special mention"
loans turns into non-performing loans and (ii) exposure of major banks to overheated sectors (Podpiera 2006 :11, IMF 2006 : 3, Chang et al. 2006 ).
The Big Three's proportion of "special mention" loans stood between 8 and 11 percent in mid 2006. These are loans where borrower shows some weakness in repayment, but they are not yet long overdue. Should they be downgraded further, they would turn into earning risk and require provisions (special mention loans require only 2% provisioning, whereas non-performing loans 25 to 100 percent). Chan et al. (2007: 35) argue that the high level of special mention loans should not matter because the figure is inflated by a prudent practice of including all loans to enterprises with less than three years of financial statements in this category. The benign view is also supported by the fact that only about 6% of special mention loans turned into substandard loans in 2006. Lai (2007: 27) runs a sensitivity analysis showing that this rate of downgrades has immaterial impact on bottom line and stability indicators 30 . However, rating agency analysts are again more skeptical than brokers. They take the view that in medium term it may be 50 percent of the special mention loans that turns nonperforming. If that is the case the Net NPLs/Equity ratios for major banks would rise from 14 percent to 69 percent (Chu et al. 29 The significance of diversification for further prospects of large banks is hotly debated. Some analysts argue that retail would be the source of stability and profitability (Lai 2007) , whereas others point out that the share of retail loans is oscillating within 15 to 20 percent of total loans thus the Big Three would remain engaged in much riskier corporate lending (CEQ 2006) . 30 Her sensitivity analysis shows that if 5% of special mention loans are downgraded to NPLs, the Big Three 2006 earnings can reduce by 10 to 13%, ROE by 1.5-1.7 and CAR by 0.1 percentage points. She argues that unless there is an economy-wide slowdown, the net 5% rate of special mention loan downgrades is reasonable, because there are some upgrades too. The high exposure to overheated sectors is also considered benign unless there is an unexpected economic slowdown. Lai (2007: 32) argues that in all cases of macroeconomic tightening during the past 5 years the negative impact on asset quality was limited to overheated sectors in some regions and had immaterial impact on the overall asset portfolio.
This expectation is also supported by a successful pressure of CBRC aimed at reducing lending to overheated sectors, which includes focused on-site inspections on the branch level (Chan et al. 2007 :8, CBRC 2004 
Source: Annual Reports for 2006
The key role of strategic investors was to demonstrate that the Big Three provide credible investment opportunity. They did so by investing more than USD 14 bn. This has undoubtedly contributed towards enormous success of the Big Three IPOs. Initial Public Offerings of all three banks were heavily oversubscribed by institutional as well as individual investors. Funds that were eventually raised exceed initial expectations by a huge margin. 35 These IPOs also broke number of financial records, with the ICBC IPO being the largest ever worldwide 36 . All three banks jumped from obscurity to top lists of major banks in matter of days 37 .
35 For example, a year prior to the IPO IMF expected ICBC to raise about USD 10 bn, but the final amount was twice as much (IMF 2006: 39) . 36 Although the success is undisputable it had its price. For example, following its IPO the ICBC had been valued USD 130 bn. This needs to be compared to the total amount of capital injections and bail outs handed out to ICBC in last eight years, which totaled at USD 162 bn (CEQ 2006: 11) . 37 ICBC shares rose by 15% on the day of the IPO and it became 5 th largest bank by market capitalization in the world (The Deal, October 30, 2006) . By August 2007, it became the largest bank worldwide, when its market capitalization exceeded that of Citibank; currently it is the fourth largest publicly listed company worldwide (SinoCast, August 10, 2007). 
Exhibit 7 Big Three IPOs

Source: Financial Times and Bloomberg
The pre-IPO investors generated exceptional returns on their investments. The unrealized annual gains from their investment on the day of IPO exceeded 200 percent (see Exhibit 8).
However, strategic investors may not sell their shares until 3 years after the initial investment.
This gives them at least short term incentive to work towards stability and profitability of the Big Three banks. At mid point, their investment is performing rather well as annualized returns at June 2007 stock prices are still highly exceptional. Even, if banks only kept current market valuation until the time when the lock-in on strategic investor's shares expires (3 years after the original investment), returns on investment would remain high.
High returns of strategic investors are a consequence of high market valuation and relatively low purchasing price. Strategic investors bought shares at 1.1 to 1.2 ratio of their book value, which CBRC had to defend as not selling banks too cheap 38 . Today their shares are traded at around triple the book value, which is twice the usual ratio for Western blue chip banks. (Tang 2007 . To date the key decisions are still made in the nexus of the government and party bodies and boards are expected to go along formally approving these decisions.
None of the strategic investors took management responsibility. There are no representatives of strategic investors below the board level with the exception of a few consultants working on new product lines and staff training. The day to day management, credit approval, risk management and other essential functions remain firmly in hands of managers appointed and monitored by the Chinese shareholders. That is to say it is controlled by the Chinese Communist
Party that determines the personnel policy of all important public institutions in China (Huang, Orr 2007 .
The role of strategic investors is further reduced by the fact that they were not given an opportunity to conduct proper due diligence prior to their buy-in 39 . Instead, their contracts during the pre-IPO period guaranteed them a compensation should the book value of the bank decline below certain historical value (IMF 2006) . Given that bank IPOs turned enormously successful there was no use for these guarantees. However, their presence in the deal structure indicates that strategic investors lacked information on what they were buying into. 39 Prior to their IPOs in Hong Kong the Big Three had to submit full prospectus to potential investors that included extensive disclosure of its book. However, even prospectus disclosure falls short of due diligence typically performed by strategic investors, who tend to check many important information themselves. In short, it is a misnomer to call the strategic investors of the Big Three "strategic" given the The most important internal reform to date has been a separation of credit approval role from marketing and monitoring roles (Chu et al. 2006:6) . This is aimed at strengthening risk management practices by reducing conflicting incentives of local bankers. Previously they were responsible for marketing of new loans as well as their approval and monitoring, with their remuneration increasingly related to volume and quality of allocated loans. This made them to expand lending and cover up problems in loan quality. The separation of marketing and approval roles reduced incentives for underreporting bad loans. At the same time, it reduced influence of local political and economic interests on the lending decisions, because credit approvals and monitoring were shifted to higher level branches or banks' headquarters in case of large loans.
Banks have also formally established the internal control and internal audit departments in order to comply with the best governance practices. These departments should oversee compliance with internal as well as external rules and report directly to the Board. Although, banks invariably report presence of these departments in their organization charts, they have yet to progress beyond training staff and clarifying their role (ICBC 2007 :41, BOC 2007 : 83, CCB 2007 . The new structure is yet to become effective force in identifying and managing risk exposures.
If strategic investors do not drive internal reforms, financial markets could. At least in principle, Despite continued debates about reliability and sustainability of banks' prudential ratios and despite shortcoming in governance arrangements that underpin them, it is undisputable fact that they now comply with performance targets that CBRC stipulated in its Pilot Guidelines. The basic indicators of financial stability, profitability and cost structure of the Big Three compare well to the average of top 100 global banks (see Exhibit 10).
At the same time, this comparison masks an important difference. Most of the top 100 banks worldwide operate predominantly on mature developed markets, where profits as well as risk tend to be lower. Well governed banks in other emerging markets display somewhat higher prudential ratios and achieve similar profitability levels at lower economy-wide growth rate (Chu et al. 2006) 40 .
Exhibit 10 Net return on equity (%) shall achieve 11 percent in the second year after the completion of financial restructuring and increase to over 13 percent gradually in the subsequent years 40 Bank profitability also benefits from sustained repression of interest rates that fixes the spread between the deposit-rate ceiling and the lending-rate floor to 3.25 percent. Moreover, recent change in taxation that unifies the income tax, which was until now 15 on foreign banks and 33 percent on local banks, will provide additional short term profit boost to Big Three (Lai 2007:14 Chu et al. (2006) To summarize, targets of the governance reform were achieved it the formal sense, although implementation of governance and internal control mechanisms that underpin their reliability and sustainability is only partial and will take more time. Banks have all corporate bodies, where foreign investors can participate and they are listed on A-and H-markets. These changes are clearly supportive of continued internal reforms. On the other hand, marginal role of foreign investors in governance and management prevents the Big Three form benefiting from bank FDI in a manner comparable to other transition economies. Should there be any conflict between interests of the State Council and private shareholders, the governance structure guarantees that state interests would prevail. Apart from government's position as a majority owner, the party control over the personnel policy ensures that policy objectives will be followed.
Bank performance and market perception
The The price development and trading volume indicates continued interest of private investors.
Financial analysts also keep buy or hold recommendations on for all three stocks (see Lai 2007 , Chu et al. 2007 , for example). However, there is some concern that bank stocks, as well other stocks on mainland A-market are driven by a market bubble. The demand for shares is driven by individual investors in mainland China, who convert their repressed-rate saving accounts into trading accounts and bet their life savings on the bullish stock market (Wehrfritz 2007 Farrell et al. (2006:47) calculate that on average the A-shares on the mainland are traded at 50 percent premium over the H-share of the same company. They explain the overvaluation by absence of other investment opportunities. Whereas Hong Kong investors may invest worldwide, the mainland investors are confined to China. This may change as China tests a pilot scheme allowing customers of several banks from select regions to make limited investments in Hong Kong. This is expected to boost Hong Kong market and may reduce difference in stock valuations.
CCB: Oct 2005 -Aug 2007
Source: Bloomberg.com
The stock market bubble could undermine the quality of banking assets through three channels.
First, restructured banks were allowed to reenter investment banking and insurance business.
This allows banks to trade in shares on their own account or account of their direct subsidiaries and thus exposes them to market risk. Until mid-1990s major banks in China operated as universal banks, but they were forced to terminate their divisions involved in brokerage (and in international transactions and credit cards) as a reaction to the uncontrolled credit boom associated with illegal speculation and fraud (Girardin 1997) 42 . In recent years these laws were amended and restructured banks are allowed to reenter other segments of financial services market again (Brean 2007 ).
Second, banks may take stocks as collateral for some loans. Inflated stock prices may encourage the spiral when loans are used to buy more stocks that are than pledged for more loans.
Widespread use of such arrangements would not only fuel the stock market bubble but also guarantee pile of bad loans in banks' books should the asset bubble burst abruptly 43 .
Third, booming stock market increases incentives for misuse of bank loans by clients. The CBRC increases pressure on banks to monitor loans and identify such situations. Some banks, including ICBC and BOC, were punished for allowing their client -the state-owned enterprise - 42 The situation resembled the financial turmoil preceding the Great depression in the US and was resolved by laws inspired by Glass-Steagall Act that separated commercial and investment banking.
to invest its short term loans into stock market and real estate. Such speculation increases leveraging of corporations and thus potential fall out of any stock market downturn.
Despite these concerns over banks role participation in the stock market boom, the optimism of stock market players is supported by major credit rating agencies, at least in their short-term outlook. They support the view that the Big Three are reliable partners within the global financial system, but also indicate that the external assistance remains highly probable in case of need. Source: Chu et al. (2006:1) The snapshot of Fitch Ratings (2006) The too big to fail logic is an obvious explanation of the implicit government guarantee. If the Big Three are not too big to fail, then this concept has little meaning. They, together with unreformed ABC, hold over 50 percent of all deposits in a society where the savings rate is 50 percent and there are no other investment opportunities for retail savers 46 . Household savings official institutions. Considered factors include bank-specific elements such as financial fundamentals, franchise value, and business and asset diversification. They do take into account other risk factors such the strength and prospective performance of the economy, as well as the structure and relative fragility of the financial system, and the quality of banking regulation and supervision (Moody's 2007) .
are motivated by personal insecurity arising from absence of functioning welfare system. Combination of forceful reasons and sufficient resources justifies expectations of private investors that the largest Chinese banks will not be allowed to fail. Essentially, share prices of the Big Three have at least as much to do with economic fundamentals as with political fundamentals that make implicit guarantee credible.
The medium term macroeconomic outlook also suggests that there is no macroeconomic crisis that could undermine the credibility of the implicit guarantee. That is important for market perception given the general consensus on close relationship between the growth rate of the 8 years, did business in every province of the country and its clients included state-owned enterprises and foreign multinationals ("Black-market banking", The Economist, August 9, 2007). 47 Especially the urban population that has no or limited access to social welfare net and no land to fall back on in case of need would be hit hard. These protests would be more difficult to contain protests than in rural areas, where violent protests are fairly frequent even now (Tanner 2004 ).
economy and financial performance of largest banks (CEQ 2006 , Chan et al. 2007 , Lai 2007 , IMF 2006 . Long term outlook remains uncertain as ever since onset China's reforms. Many economists point out that there is a limit to her growth model. For example, Csaba (2007) argues growth potential stemming from structural factors and informal institutions will be exacerbated in the long term. This would inevitably slow down economic growth unless there is a shift to more mainstream, more productivity enhancing growth model.
In the short and medium term the most important threat to economic stability continues to be overheating. The rate of savings in excess of 50 percent GDP and less than full sterilization of foreign exchange reserves floods the financial system with liquidity. Liquidity is then turned into credit expansion that drives less and less efficient and more and more speculative investments 48 . In 2006 a package of measures that included increase in bank reserves ratios, increase of interests rates and administrative measures reducing investments into real estate and overcapacity sectors, were introduced. These were only partially successful. Chan et al. These figures indicate that cooling off measures were only partially successful. Although the growth rates in fixed and real estate assets slowed down, they remain high. Consequently, the annual economic growth still oscillates between 11 and 12 percent, which is high even by the Chinese standards. Although there is no prediction of immediate macroeconomic crisis, the continued investment boom may result in banking losses later on. The soft landing that would reduce this risk is yet to materialize. 48 There is some evidence that investments are increasingly inefficient. China need to invest 5 dollars to generate 1 dollar of new output. During their rapid industrialization periods, Japan and South Korea Incremental capital-output ratios were 3.5 and 3.7 respectively (Farrell et al. 2006: 78) .
49 Lai (2007: 9) calculates that proportion of average monthly mortgage payment to average urban household income remains low at 34%, although in Beijing and Shanghai it is over 50%.
Conclusion
We have reviewed the progress of reforms of the three largest banks in China. We aimed at finding out whether they became independent commercial entities operating according to international banking practices. The evaluation was based on the idea advanced by the Financial Stability Forum that the best way to promote financial stability and development in emerging banking sectors is to adopt international best practices in banking governance, risk management and supervision. Our conclusion is that while major banks were stabilized and international standards are being implemented there are three important caveats which undermine reform achievements.
First, it will take a lot more time before the modern banking practices proliferate from headquarters to every local branch. This is not surprising given the short span of the most recent Third, the banking reform takes place in the context of transformation of Chinese economy. This brings in many intervening variables such as weaknesses of supporting institutions -from accounting and auditing standards to free financial press, to prevalent corruption and to sizeable proportion of regulated prices. These factors combined make banking operations based on international standards more difficult, even if these standards were fully implemented.
Moreover, other characteristics of the Chinese economy such 10 percent growth, 50 percent saving rate and liquidity generated by sterilization operations of the central bank, make it easier to postpone further reforms.
The most interesting finding of this review is the selective use of international standards. That reforms take time and are complicated by other characteristics of economy in transition is well established and does not need further discussion. However, interpretation of the selective use of international standards can be interpreted at least from three viewpoints.
The received view of the Financial Stability Forum is that departure from international standards is detrimental for reform outcomes in emerging economies. International best practices are perceived as minimal, internally consistent set of principles that should create incentive matrix that would facilitate prudent, profitable banking operations and prevent distortions in international competition. Therefore selective implementation of international standards that introduces many technicalities but avoids some of the most important principles should be regarded as reform failure. In the case of Chinese banking reforms the reform failure is a consequence of a fundamental flaw of the reform design, not just a temporary problem. There are no plans for reforms that would guarantee independence of banking regulators and it is questionable whether such arrangement would be possible without political reforms 50 .
From the developmental perspective the selective implementation may be a good news. It creates policy space for the government to support its development strategy by multiple tools including the state owned banks that remain under the firm control of the State Council and the Party. After all, number of East Asian states have used repressed financial sector to support its export oriented developmental strategy (World Bank 1993) . The obvious drawback of this strategy is that repressed banks may fuel speculative borrowing that will do little for real sector restructuring. Instead it may contribute to asset value bubble in stock market, real estate and other overheated sectors that will eventually turn many loans into losses as it happened after early 1990s banking boom (Girardin 1997) .
The success of the developmental strategy depends on the government ability to keep the right balance between the need to provide favorable financing to project important for development one hand, and need to ensure financial stability of banks on the other. Chinese record in pursuing heterodox economic policies in various sectors is enviable (Qian 2003) . However, banking reforms to date can not be regarded as one of these success stories as evidenced by the repeated bail outs. On the other hand, the CBRC may be able to strike better balance between the policy roles of the Big Three and need to ensure that losses would not threaten banks' stability. If that was a case, China might be able "to cross [the banking reform] river by feeling for the stones" as Deng famously recommended.
The third interpretation may be that selective implementation of international standards reflects specifics of the Chinese institutional environment. It is well established insight of the new institutional economics that transplants of foreign institutions, such as international standards in banking, require some tweaking to make them work in the local environment that is short of important supporting institutions. This could certainly explain some departures from best practice in loan classification, risk weighting and other technicalities. However, the absence 50 Political independence of regulators falls into similar category as independence of courts, which is fundamental for the rule of law. There is extensive debate whether rule of law is possible in a one-party state. See, for example, Wei 2003 , Diamond 2003 or Friedman 2003 of independence goes against the logic of international standards and thus can not be regarded as mere local adjustments.
For now major banks remain part and parcel of Chinese state run transformation. If the experience of smaller transition economies is any guide to the future, then we should expect that China would chose (or be forced by harsher economic circumstances) to converge to the international standards and allow international bankers to take managerial responsibility. Such a scenario would allow it to reap the benefits of FDI in banks as it did in the real sector.
Alternatively, China may defy the experience of other transition countries and sustain the developmental model for much longer. That would require designing and implementing such bank governance and regulatory arrangements that would ensure stability of state controlled banks even under less benign economic conditions. That is not straightforward as the international experience shows that state run banks tend to require repetitive state-run bailouts, especially if they are as important as in China. It remains a question for further research to see which way Chinese reforms would move from the current stage.
Nevertheless, the evidence gathered in this paper is sufficient to dispel some of the excessively optimistic interpretations of recent Chinese reforms. Namely, it suggests that Chinese banks are not yet like any other large commercial banks on the global markets and that the regulatory framework in China still suffers from major loopholes that create room for distortion in reporting and disclosure of key stability indicators. The view that listed Chinese banks, for now restructured and cleared of legacy NPLs, operate like any other large banks is driven by a cursory look at financial indicators. However, at closer look there are serious doubts about sustainability of the favorable financial indicators. On the performance level, we have pointed out fast credit expansion and high proportion of substandard loans as two major threats. On the bank governance level, the limited role of strategic investors, market oversight weakened by implicit state guarantee and lack of commercial independence of bank governance bodies, suggest that major banks are not commercially oriented entities. In short, the Big Three banks retain "Chinese specifics" in their daily operations that ought to be considered when assessing their future prospects.
